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This study is set out to explore how cognitive biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot 
hand effect, exert an effect on individual crop insurance purchase decision. A laboratory 
experiment comprised of two separate games was used to establish an insurance purchase 
environment to induce individual’s behavior. The gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect 
failed to be found in the experiment. But the subjects’ perceived probability of loss plays 
a significant role in determine their purchase decisions—the higher probability they 
predicted, the more likely to buy insurance they were. It is also fascinating to find that the 
longer the exposure to random risks the subjects had, the more willing to engage in 




I would dedicate this research to my parents, Qian Zhongqing and Wan Xiaohong. 




First of all, I would like to give all of my most earnest gratitude to my major 
professor, Dr. Keith Coble, for your professional guidance and enthusiastic inspiration.. 
I also have to give tons of thanks to my committee members Dr. Ardian Harri, Dr. 
Kalyn Coatney and Dr. Barry Barnett for their support full of consideration and 
motivation with passion. 
I also need to thank Dr. Angelica Williams and my friend John Barr who helped 
me with writing for their sincere help. 
 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
DEDICATION .................................................................................................................... ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF TABLES ............................................................................................................. vi 
LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... vii 
CHAPTER 
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................1 
Brief history of Federal crop insurance program ...............................................1 
Premium Subsidy in Crop Insurance .................................................................4 
Normative vs Behavioral ...................................................................................7 
Cognitive Errors in Crop Insurance Purchase ....................................................8 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................9 
Risk Reference ...................................................................................................9 
Risk perception and subjective probability ......................................................11 
Risk perception ..........................................................................................11 
Subjective Probability ................................................................................13 
Bayesian updating ......................................................................................14 
Biases in Risk Perception and Its Application in Insurance ............................15 
Gambler's fallacy & hot hand effect ..........................................................16 
Gambler's Fallacy ................................................................................16 
Hot Hand ..............................................................................................18 
Differences between Hot Hand and Gambler’s Fallacy ......................20 
Application of cognitive biases in insurance study....................................22 
Research on Crop Insurance Demand ..............................................................23 
III. CONCEPTURAL FRAMEWORK .................................................................26 
Conceptual Model ............................................................................................26 
Hypotheses .......................................................................................................29 
Hypothesis One: Hot (Cold) Hand Effect. .................................................29 
Hypothesis Two: Gambler’s Fallacy .........................................................30 
Data Analysis ...................................................................................................30 
 
v 
Binary logistic model .................................................................................31 
Experimental Economics .................................................................................32 
IV. THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT AND EXPERIMENTAL 
DESIGN ...............................................................................................35 
Holt-Laury Lottery Choice Task ......................................................................36 
Game One: Dichotomous Choice Task............................................................38 
Game Two: Modified Offerman & Sonnemans’ Experiment Task .................41 
Revenue data generation ............................................................................42 
Quadratic scoring rule ................................................................................45 
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS ...................................47 
Experiment Results ..........................................................................................47 
General description of risk preference .......................................................47 
General description of reported probability ...............................................49 
General description of purchase choices ....................................................54 
Data Analysis ...................................................................................................57 
Probability regression ................................................................................57 
Probability regression for Game One ..................................................59 
Probability regression for Game Two ..................................................62 
Demand regression.....................................................................................63 
Demand regression model for Game One ............................................63 
Demand regression model for Game Two ...........................................66 





A. IRB APPROVAL AND EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS ...........................79 




LIST OF TABLES 
 4.1 Risk Preference Decision Sheet .........................................................................37 
 4.2 Expected Payoff .................................................................................................38 
 4.3 Payoff table of quadratic scoring rule ................................................................46 
 5.1 Risk Aversion Coefficient ..................................................................................48 
 5.2 Summary Statistics of Scores and Probability ...................................................52 
 5.3 Subjects’ correlation perceptions compared to true correlation .........................53 
 5.4 Summary Statistics of Purchase Choices ...........................................................54 
 5.5 Normality test for the purchase choices across individuals in both games ........55 
 5.6 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test ......................................................................57 
 5.7 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability 
Regression in Game One ........................................................................59 
 5.8 Results from Probability Regression in Game One ...........................................60 
 5.9 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability 
Regression in Game Two .......................................................................62 
 5.10 Results of Probability Regression in Game Two ...............................................63 
 5.11 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand 
Regression without Square Term in Game One .....................................65 
 5.12 Results from Demand Regression without Square Term in Game One .............66 
 5.13 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand 
Regression in Game Two .......................................................................68 
 5.14 Results from Demand Regression in Game Two ...............................................69 
 
vii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 1.1 Insured Acres from 1989 to 2013 in United States ..............................................2 
 1.2 Crop Insurance Liabilities From 1989 to 2013 in United States ..........................3 
 1.3 Premiums, Subsidy and Subsidy Rate in Crop Insurance From 1989 to 
2013 ..........................................................................................................5 
 1.4 Loss Ratio and Producer Loss Ratio in Crop Insurance from 1989 to 
2013 ..........................................................................................................7 
 4.1 The histogram of 1000 revenue observations presented to subjects in 
Game One ...............................................................................................39 
 4.2 The example of a line chart of randomly drawn 20 observations in 
Game Two ..............................................................................................44 
 5.1 The distribution of risk preference across individuals .......................................49 
 5.2 The histogram shown to subjects in Game One .................................................50 
 5.3 The distribution of score across individuals in Game One ................................51 
 5.4 The distribution of score across individuals in Game Two ................................52 
 5.5 The distribution of count of purchase choices across individuals in 
Game One ...............................................................................................55 
 5.6 The distribution of count of purchase choices across individuals in 
Game Two ..............................................................................................56 
 5.7 Reported probability of loss from 4 randomly drawn subjects who all 






Insurance is a vital tool to protect people from losses such as unexpected 
accidents or significant financial catastrophes.  Farmers are especially vulnerable to 
financial harm caused by low probability high consequence events such as drought, flood 
or disease.1 Crops are commodities without brand attributes, meaning farmers are more 
vulnerable to price fluctuations from selling the undifferentiated products. 
Brief history of Federal crop insurance program 
In the United States, a variety of crop insurance programs have been developed 
and regulated by the government, but delivered to farmers by private insurance 
companies.  Meanwhile, the federal government also offers farmers a considerable 
number of subsidies to reduce the costs. Established on a small scale in 1938, the U.S. 
federal crop insurance program has grown into a sizable risk management system with 
numerous programs holding a total liability exceeding $123.6 billion and a coverage of 
296.2 million acres in 2013 (Figure1.1 and Figure 1.2). However, this has been 
accompanied by a significant cost to the taxpayers, and government expenditure on crop 
                                                 
1 This state of the world is no different than people/firms living/operating in flood, forest fire, hurricane and earthquake areas, as well 




insurance is expected to exceed all other spending on farm commodity programs during 
the fiscal periods 2011 to 2020 (Bulut et al., 2012).   
 
Figure 1.1 Insured Acres from 1989 to 2013 in United States2 
 
                                                 





Figure 1.2 Crop Insurance Liabilities From 1989 to 2013 in United States3 
 
Federal crop insurance was first authorized in 1938 in a support of Roosevelt’s 
presidential campaign. In the first 40 years of its existence, only limited types of crops 
and a limited number of counties were eligible for coverage. The Federal Crop Insurance 
Act of 1980 came into effect and expanded the coverage for more types of crops. Under 
the 1980 Act, the federal government transitioned the delivery of crop insurance to 
private insurance companies and began subsidizing premiums to boost participation. 
Despite these innovative reforms, participation rates still remained low during the 1980’s. 
In their analysis of U.S. crop insurance participation rates, Gardner and Kramer (1986) 
concluded that to obtain a 50% participation rate, insurance had to be subsidized by as 
much as 50% due to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
                                                 




In response to low participation, in 1994 the Congress attempted to link insurance 
to other USDA benefits and further increased premium subsidies (Glauber, 2012). As a 
result, the Crop Insurance Reform Act of 1994 was enacted and provided coverage 
starting at a basic level. Catastrophic risk protection (CAT) was fully subsidized but 
required producers to participate in commodity price support. A series of farm programs 
followed these developments. Under the incentive of the Reform Act, enrollment in buy-
up coverage strongly increased during the late 1990s. To further stimulate participation, 
Congress later updated the Reform Act to include greater premium subsidies in 1999 and 
2000. As shown in figure 1.1, the acres enrolled in the crop insurance program increased 
from 182 million areas in 1998 to over 296.2 million in 2013 -- a 62.7% increase in 15 
years. Additionally, total liabilities rose to $123.4 billion in 2013 from $44.3 billion 
(figure 1.2), almost a tripling in as short as 8 years.  
Premium Subsidy in Crop Insurance 
Crop insurance is different from many other forms of insurance in that the 
government has to entice people with subsidies to buy it. This kind of stimulus is not 
required for many other types of low probability high consequence insurance. For 
example, Eisner and Strotz (1961) found that people tend to pay far more for flight 
insurance than the breakeven cost of the seller. Stimulating such a substantial growth in 
crop insurance participation is costly. Each year the federal government subsidizes 
farmers, on average, $7 billion from 2011 through 2013 (shown in Figure 1.3). In all, 
premium, administrative and operating cost subsidies constitute most of the costs of the 
U.S. crop insurance programs. For example in 2008, roughly 60 percent of premiums 
(more than $5.5 billion) were paid to insured producers. Additionally, roughly $2 billion 
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in administrative and operating subsidies was paid to the private companies that sell and 
service insurance policies.4  
 
Figure 1.3 Premiums, Subsidy and Subsidy Rate in Crop Insurance From 1989 to 
20135 
 
It is widely agreed upon in the academic literature that increased participation in 
crop insurance program requires an increase in premium subsidies; and without adequate 
subsidies, producers are not likely to buy crop insurance (Coble and Barnett, 2012; 
Glauber, 2004; Goodwin and Smith, 2012; Glauber, 2012).  Goodwin, Coble, and Knight 
                                                 
4 Data source from Risk Management of USDA, http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-
practices-management/risk-management/government-programs-
risk.aspx#.UXtRu7WG3YQ 




found that the demand for crop insurance is inelastic at low with respect to premium. In 
addition, the marginal costs per acre for enrollment into the program are high relative to 
other lines of insurance, which causes a greater level of premium subsidies to achieve 
politically acceptable participation rate (Glauber, 2004). 
Because crop insurance is subsidized it is insightful to view both the official 
actuarial loss ratio which shows how well rate are set and producer loss ratio which offers 
a more insightful perspective in terms of producer benefits. The loss ratio, equal to the 
indemnity divided by premiums paid by producers, still remains high in the recent decade 
(the black line in Figure 1.4). An actuarial fair program would have an average loss ratio 
of 1.0. It unveils the problem completely when indemnities are compared to the adjusted 
premium (total premium minus premium subsidy): each dollar paid by farmers receives 
$2.67 in indemnity repayments in 2013 (the red line in Figure 1.4). 
 So far as we can see the crop insurance that I have been discussing is nothing but 
an “income transfer policy” (pp490, Goodwin and Smith, 2012) The financial burden on 
taxpayers also makes it difficult to replicate the insurance program in other countries, not 
to mention the market distortion crop insurance may cause (Goodwin and Smith, 2012). 




Figure 1.4 Loss Ratio and Producer Loss Ratio in Crop Insurance from 1989 to 20136 
 
Normative vs Behavioral 
Numerous research projects have been motivated by an attempt to explain why 
crop insurance requires such significant subsidization. Most of the research concerning 
crop insurance demand is based on normative models of choice, such as expected utility 
theory and Bayesian updating. But increasing empirical evidence suggests that normative 
models cannot explain individual choices adequately (Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). 
Also, people tend to exhibit certain biases in the perception of risks. Psychology is being 
increasingly applied to economics research as market behaviors cannot be adequately 
explained through traditional economic theories. It is suggested that both economic 
factors and psychology should be considered when an individual’s insurance purchase is 
                                                 




studied. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) also argued that while normative models are less 
identifiable, laboratory experiments and surveys can provide deep insight into individual 
decision making process and help design more effective public policies.   
Cognitive Errors in Crop Insurance Purchase 
Policy makers and researchers have frequently questioned whether there are 
cognitive errors made by producers when they are considering participation in crop 
insurance programs. Further, could these biases affect the desirability of crop insurance? 
Several papers have addressed cognitive bias in other lines of insurance (McClelland et 
al., 1993) but none have specifically addressed cognitive bias with crop insurance.  
The objective of this research is to evaluate whether cognitive bias is a viable 
explanation of why farmers refrain from purchasing crop insurance. To do so, I 
conducted a series of experiments designed to identify two plausible cognitive biases in a 
simplified setting related to raw crop production, event probability assessment and 






Sitkin and Weingart (1995) assert that taking actions involving risks is influenced 
by both risk perception and risk attitude. Expected Utility theory (EU) is a long asserted 
theory of decision making under risk. Daniel Bernoulli (1954) first introduced an EU 
hypothesis in 1738 to address the St. Petersburg paradox which argues that expected 
values are infinite due to a feature of lack of upper bounds in some probability 
distributions. Later, Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) formally proposed a theorem 
of EU and proved that any individual whose preferences satisfy the four following 
axioms has a utility function: completeness, transitivity, continuity, and Archimedean 
property. In the theorem, a finite set of n mutually exclusive outcomes ( ia A ) each 
occurs with probability ip . The decision maker observes two (or more) compound lottery 
choices X and Y expressed as: i iX p a  and j iY p a  i j  For a given individual, 
there exists such a utility function that satisfies the statement: X Y , if and only if, 
( ( )) ( ( ))E u X E u Y , where ( ( ))E u X represents the expected utility : 
1 1 1 1( ( )) ( ) ... ( )n n n nE u p a p a p u a p u a     . 
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Risk preferences are generally divided into three categories: risk averse, risk 
neural and risk seeking. However, despite its wide application, expected utility theory is 
faced with challenges for example, from prospect theory.  
Alternatively, prospect theory provides a more flexible model of risk behavior 
than EU (Barberis, 2013). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed prospect theory in 
four components: 
(i) Reference dependence - people have reference points to value gains and losses 
when evaluating risks.  
(ii) Loss aversion - concave in gains and convex in losses; in other words, the 
disutility from losing an amount of money is larger than the happiness from 
gaining the same amount of money.  
(iii) Diminishing sensitivity - people tend to be risk averse over moderate 
probability gains but risk seeking over losses.  
(iv) Probability weighting - overestimating low probabilities and underestimating 
high probabilities.  
Over the last few decades, researchers have attempted to apply prospect theory to 
economic situations such as insurance. Using insurance purchase data from a large home 
insurance company, Sydnor (2010) found that households are willing to pay higher 
premiums to purchase a lower deductible policy. This sounds unreasonable but can be 
explained by the use of prospect theory. Sydnor (2010) suggested an explanation based 
on the probability weighting in prospect theory. A household is inclined to overestimate 
the low-probability event under the force of unbalanced probability weighting. Due to 
this overwhelming concern about claims in tail events, the household would readily pay a 
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higher premium to prevent from an extreme event. Barseghyan et al. (2012) found 
evidence suggesting that probability weighting plays a vital role in individual decisions 
when analyzing insurance deductible choices. 
There are also some other violations of EU, for example, the violation of 
“independence axiom”. This axiom states that the utility and the probability of outcome 
are independent and should first be evaluated separately and then multiplied by each 
other. Machina (1982) mathematically demonstrated that the results of expected utility 
analysis do not necessarily rely on the “independent axiom”, which means that the utility 
and the probability have an interactive impact mutually; for example, Camerer (1989) 
explains how the independence axiom is inconsistent with some realistic situations where 
people may overestimate the probability of winning a lottery because of the positive 
utility like a huge amount of unexpected bonus it would bring in while underestimating 
the chance of having their houses ruined by an earthquake because of the negative utility 
like financial loss it would cause.  
 Weber and Camerer (1987) relaxed this assumption and presented a modified 
model allowing interaction between outcomes and probabilities.  
Risk perception and subjective probability 
Risk perception 
The normative model and alternative theories supplementing the expected utility 
theory for risk preference are far from enough to understand how people make decisions 
under risky circumstances. Risk perception is another important contributor to influence 
individual’s risky decision. 
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The risk in our world is perceived by individual, and thus the degree of risk 
perceived of the same event may vary from individual to individual. Risk perception is 
the process where people make a risk judgment subjectively. Subjective risk assessment 
may provide a deeper understanding of what drives decision making under risk. The 
study of risk perception began to boom during the early 1980’s when the public perceived 
high risks from nuclear power while experts regarded it as a low-risk issue (Drottz-
Sjöberg, 1991). 
Weber (2001) reviewed three approaches to investigate risk perception: the 
axiomatic measurement paradigm, the social-cultural paradigm, and the psychometric 
paradigm. Axiomatic measurement paradigm focuses on the way people transform the 
objective information subjectively to perceive the effect of risks on their daily life. 
Within social-cultural paradigm study, the variable of dissimilarity between groups or 
cultures on risk perceptions is examined. The psychometric paradigm relates people’s 
reactions to risky situations to emotional fluctuation that affect the assessment of 
riskiness of practical environment in ways that are in odds with their rational and 
objective judgments. Slovic and Peters (2006) refer to risk perception as a feeling or 
affection which is our instinctive reactions to danger. They further suggest that risk as a 
feeling interpretation is not enough; in other situations affect would lead us to judge 
probabilities in inefficient ways. In the other hand, using probability principles to 





Because individual risk perceptions are subjective, researchers must attempt to 
elicit the risk perception from subjects. Subjective probability is the way to measure a 
person's belief towards risks or in other words, risk perception, from the perspective of 
the personalistic school of probability (Hogarth, 1975). Fishburn (1986) argued that the 
theory of subjective probability attempts to connect inherent dispositions towards 
uncertainty and quantitative probability. Grisley and Kellogg (1983) provided a more 
elaborate definition of subjective probability: a subjective probability is the decision 
maker’s beliefs concerning the probability of an uncertain outcome. They further state 
that a subjective probability distribution is individualistic and can neither be proven right 
or wrong. From a statistical standpoint, each subjective probability is subject to a certain 
distribution. If a decision maker's subjective probability distribution can be measured, 
then researchers can better understand the manner in which individuals perceive specified 
risks.  
Few economic studies have focused on eliciting individual subjective probability. 
Grisley and Kellogg (1983) conducted a survey in northern Thailand where they 
attempted to elicit farmers’ subjective probability towards agricultural decisions such as 
crop production and marketing. Their results demonstrated that it is feasible to obtain 
farmers’ subjective probability distributions directly for economic indicators, such as 
crop yields, prices, and net incomes. They further emphasized that the distributions they 
elicited can be thought of as realistic and logical in general. Coble et al. (2011) utilized 
elicitation and aggregation techniques to guide participants to acquire accurate subjective 
 
14 
estimates of unknown probabilities. Their findings suggested that subjective probability 
assessment is feasible to elicit, at least in a laboratory setting.  
Bayesian updating 
Bayesian updating is another normative model that is extensively used by 
economists to examine decisions under uncertainty. This approach posits that people are 
able to update their information and change their subjective probability beliefs and its 
distribution according to the Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem refers to the relationship 
between the individual’s posterior beliefs about the probabilities of events A and B 
occurring given, a set of priors. The most common mathematical statement of Bayes Rule 
is ( | ) ( )( | )
( )
P B A P AP A B
P B
 . Here, the conditional probability A given B represents the 
individual’s posterior beliefs derived from the individual’s priors ( )P A , ( )P B  and the 
likelihood function ( | )P B A .   
However, normative models, including Bayesian updating, have difficulty in 
adequately explaining the human behavior observed in the real world. Camerer et al. 
(2005) criticized Bayesian updating as “unlikely to be correct descriptively” since it is 
based on a stack of assumptions that are cognitively unrealistic, such as, a requirement of 
a separation between the probabilities of previous-judged events, and no effects of the 
order of information received. Gilboa et al. (2008) stated that although Bayesian updating 
fails to suggest a feasible model of prior belief formation; it illustrates how these beliefs 
are updated according to Bayes’ rule. Furthermore, there have been some experimental 
studies in economics and psychology on whether or how people update information 
according to Bayes’ rule. Kahneman and Tversky (1971 and 1973) found that people 
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update subjective probability of an uncertain event subject to its parent population, which 
is known as representativeness heuristic7. Grether (1980) found experimental evidence to 
support the idea that people tend to ignore previous information when a belief is formed, 
which is contrary to the Bayesian rule. But Offerman and Sonnemans (2004) determined 
that people indeed exhibit Bayesian behaviors and nevertheless tend to overreact beyond 
Bayesian updating as a result of showing the hot hand effect or the recency effect.  
Biases in Risk Perception and Its Application in Insurance 
Decisions making under uncertainty are dependent on the "belief" in the perceived 
risks or subjective probability towards risky events. I raise the questions; what determines 
an individual's beliefs, and what impacts an individual’s subjective assessments of the 
probability of uncertain events? In a famous paper by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), 
they asserted that people tend to rely on a few heuristic principles which reduce difficulty 
or complexity of assessing probability and therefore simplify the process of predicting 
outcomes. A heuristic principle is a rule of thumb, which is generally useful, but 
sometimes may lead to systematic decision errors. In their study, Tverskey and 
Kahneman described three of heuristics: representativeness, availability, and adjustment 
and anchoring. Tversky and Kahneman also provided a plausible explanation--a lack of 
appropriate code-- for the failure of people to learn statistical rules in the lifelong 
experiences to avoid cognitive biases and detect these biases in their assessments of 
probability. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) suggested that certain biases in risk 
                                                 
7 By the definition of proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), the representativeness heuristic leads 
people to judge the probability of an uncertain event, “by the degree to which it: (i) is similar in essential 




perception or probability assessment are uncovered when these heuristic principles are 
employed. That is to say heuristic principles are able to account for some cognitive 
biases.  
Schkade and Johnson (1989) analyzed results from a series of gamble 
experiments to explore bias using methods of both probability and certainty equivalence.  
They concluded that subjects adopting heuristic response strategies are more likely to 
show significant biases than those using expectation skills. Schwarz and Strack (1991) 
point out that Kahneman and Tversky’s heuristics could be considered as primary 
evidence to end the problem of social psychology in terms of fallacies and errors in 
information processing. Gigerenzer (1996) had some different voices stating that most 
“errors” in probability judgment are not violations of normative probability models, but 
ignorance of conceptual distinctions of the fundamentals of probability theory.  
In general, cognitive biases have been a focus of study for many years. In recent 
years a variety of new cognitive biases have been identified and increasingly applied in 
behavioral economics models. Among them, the “gambler’s fallacy” and “hot hand 
effect” have been more frequently studied than other cognitive fallacies. 
Gambler's fallacy & hot hand effect 
Gambler's Fallacy 
Although gambler's fallacy is said to be an elementary and intuitive judgmental 
error by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), this fallacy commonly occurs in various 
occasions. A body of literature has developed in an attempt to interpret whyhis error is 
made. The heart of the gambler's fallacy is a misinterpretation of the fairness of chance 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). The gambler has such a feeling that the fairness of a 
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game, like coin flipping, enables him to expect that any deviation in one direction would 
be offset or corrected by a corresponding deviation in the opposite direction in the next 
turn, making the overall sequence subject to the underlying probability distribution (in 
the “coin flipping” case, the sequence is binomially distributed and people tend to 
overestimate the balance of the sequence). However, based on statistical principles, any 
two events in this game are statistically independent; in other words, past experience has 
nothing to with the odds of occurrence of upcoming events in a random series. This 
inability of detecting randomness is known as “the belief in the law of small numbers” 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1971). In statistics, the law of larger numbers tells us that a 
large amount of samples would be reliably representative of the population from which 
they are drawn. The law of small numbers asserts that the law of larger numbers is also at 
work even when the size of sample pool becomes very small. 
Clotfelter and Cook (1993) provided evidence that behaviors of lottery players are 
consistent with the gambler’s fallacy. Altmann and Burns (2005) conducted an 
experiment to examine how different lengths of streaks will bias probability perception. 
In their experiment, participants were experiencing a series of heads and tails generated 
by a simulated coin with a 75% or 60% chance to be heads. They found a quadratic trend 
of prediction of outcomes according to increased streak lengths. At the beginning when a 
streak of certain heads (two or three) shows up, subjects exhibited a positive recency 
effect; a negative recency trend was discovered just before reverting back to positive 
recency in the end. In this study, Altmann and Burns utilized a memory model as an 
explanation of the experiment results. Barron and Leider (2010) carried out an interesting 
study specifically on how people acquire information to make decision, either by 
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personal experience or abstract description, exerts an effect on outcome predictions in the 
future. The results revealed that subjects appeared to employ the Gambler’s fallacy when 
experiencing outcomes sequentially; and the Gambler’s fallacy was weakened when 
outcomes are revealed to subjects all at once.  
Hot Hand  
“Hot hand” often reminds us of the times that some of the best basketball players, 
like Michael Jordan or Kobe Bryant, experienced a “shooting streak” and produced 
phenomenal performances in games. The belief in “hot hand” or “streak shooting” is 
commonly shared by fans, basketball players, or even coaches. Gilovich et al. (1985) 
originated a wave of research of hot hand phenomenon. They used field-goal data from 9 
members of the Philadelphia 76ers during 1980-1981 season and free-throw data from 9 
players in the Boston Celtics during the 1980-1981 and the 191-1982 seasons and found 
that the outcomes of both field goals and free throws are independent of previous 
attempts. Later Larkey, Smith, and Kadane (1989) questioned the validity of their 
statistical analysis. Tversky and Gilovich (1989) latter defended their opinion by saying 
that there is no evidence for hot hand, even in a local (short-lived) phenomenon case: the 
overall mean of correlation is just 0.02. Koehler and Conley (2003) examined a unique 
setting where 23 shooters in the NBA Long Shootout contests, 1994-1997, were used to 
test the hypothesis of the hot hand effect. The results provided no evidence to support the 
hot hand even for players who were “on fire”. So they concluded that the belief in the 
“hot hand” by basketball players is a description of historical performance rather than a 
predictor for future behavior.  
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On the other hand, Gilden and Wilson (1995) found some evidence of the hot 
hand in golf and darts or alternatively cold hand, or in their words, “in a streak”. More 
specifically, they asserted that a streak is a general property of skilled performance. 
Dorsey-Palmateer and Smith (2004) found supportive evidence in bowling using the real 
data of 43 plays in Professional Bowlers Association (PBA) during the 2002-2003 
season.  
Hot hand seems to be a misconception of randomness. Gilovich et al. (1985) 
suggested that the hot hand belief might be caused by a memory bias. Streaks are more 
memorable than alternations, so the probability of a streak occurring will be 
overestimated by observer. Another explanation is that people tend to believe there is a 
predictable pattern in a series of random and independent events even when one does not 
(Tversky and Gilovich, 1989). 
Some researchers have made use of simulations to study hot hand behavior. For 
example, Miyoshi (2000) simulated shooting records based on Bernoulli trials where 
successful shots were manipulated to follow streaks of hot-hand attempts. The results 
indicated that the tests run by Gilovich et al. (1985) are not significantly sensitive to 
detect the hot-hand effect (only 12% of hot hand phenomenon was discovered in the test). 
Burns (2004) generated a program based on the Markov process. Basketball shooting 
success was simulated using several parameters, including a hot hand belief. Only 43 out 
of 4752 (48×99) pairs of simulation trials resulted in negative advantage scores. 
Therefore, they concluded that relying on the hot hand is an efficient strategy as this 
behavior gains more scores.  
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Differences between Hot Hand and Gambler’s Fallacy 
In many studies, the gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect are discussed together. 
These two fallacies both refer to a misconception of chance based on representativeness 
(Gilovich, Vallone, and Tversky, 1985). Rabin (2002) proposed a clear explanation with 
respect to representativeness using a well-known “run” experiment to explain how the 
two different beliefs relate to a misconception of chance. Some individuals may think of 
this urn as a small urn and a streak of balls with one color would sufficiently decrease the 
probability of its appearance in the next draw. However, a small urn, as Rabin proposed, 
could lead us to the other side as well; a streak of balls with one color in such a small urn 
would force people to reconsider the proportion of this color in it. Thus, as more and 
more balls with one color show up, the expectation of presence of the same color in the 
next time will be increased. Unfortunately, Rabin did not determine a general conclusion 
to clarify how these two beliefs of Bayesian updating theories interact. However, this 
interpretation is questioned by Ayton and Fischer (2004). They argued that the 
representativeness is incomplete, and possibly erroneous to account for the two opposite 
reactions to randomness. The experimental results from a simulated roulette wheel game 
highlights that subjects simultaneously show both hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy 
respectively for statistically differentiable sequences at the same time. They suggested 
that both effects can occur as people come across a misconception of randomness.  
Croson and Sundali (2005) made a statement that gambler’s fallacy occurs when a 
non-autocorrelated random sequence is perceived as a relationship of negative 
autocorrelation, while hot hand effect is a belief that non-autocorrelated random sequence 
has a positive autocorrelation. These definitions of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand 
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provide a statistical perspective that can also be found in other related literature. Croson 
and Sundali (2005) attempted to identify these two biases separately within a given 
individual player in a field experiment (roulette games in casino), in order to identify the 
interaction between them. They concluded that a “significant and positive” correlation 
between gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect within individuals who behave in 
consistence with both fallacious beliefs. A shared cause for the two cognitive biases 
however, was not discovered in their study.  
Other than the statistical distinction between two fallacies, some other subtle but 
important differences are found. In Burns and Corpus’ study (2004), experimental results 
demonstrated that when events are perceived to be nonrandom, going with streaks should 
bring in better outcomes than against streaks; in other words, people tend to believe in a 
“hand hot” when they believe the sequence of outcomes is nonrandom since this is a 
dominant strategy compared to when events are judged to be random. However, their 
experimental results also support that randomness of an event may exert a positive effect 
on people’s utilization of the gambler’s fallacy. Nickerson (2002) reported similar results. 
Moreover, hot hand believers also believe that “hot” applies only to a particular person, 
and not for a particular outcome (Croson and Sundali, 2005). Ayton and Fischer (2004) 
utilized computer software to simulate the actions of a hypothetical but schematic roulette 
wheel, and recorded subject responses and level of confidence in probability judgment 
and argued that subjects believe that an individual can become “hot”, but an inanimate 
device cannot. , In the last game of general discussion, Ayton and Fischer tried some 
other explanations of these two phenomena. Representativeness could account for both 
cognitive biases effectively, though not complete; Life experiences—negative or positive 
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recent experience in daily life—could also be a cause of both erroneous belief In 
addition, this article concluded that people indeed exhibit a fallible belief of hot hand or 
gambler’s fallacy in terms of the randomness concept and suggested that people would 
use a means of encoding to reduce the difficulty of identifying the randomness of a series. 
A simple conclusion can be drawn that an individuals’ understanding of 
randomness of a sequence of successive events plays a vital role in generating their 
beliefs about these two fallacies. 
Application of cognitive biases in insurance study 
The decision making process of insurance purchase, where consumers are seen as 
judging probability for risks, offers a potentially interesting environment where cognitive 
biases can occur. However, few research studies have addressed the issues specifically 
concerning the interaction between cognitive heuristics or bias and insurance purchase 
behavior. Existing research has revealed some interesting findings and also led to further 
study of cognitive bias in the context of decision-making in crop insurance purchase. 
Kunreuther et al. (1978) showed that flood insurance is not popular in hazard-
prone areas even when it is highly subsidized or its price is driven far below the 
actuarially fair value. Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) utilized a double-oral auction 
experiment to investigate the effect of past losses on the impending behavior by setting 
up the hypothesis of gambler’s fallacy. The authors, however, found no strong support for 
the theory from their regression results. Johnson et al. (1993) made a summary after 
reviewing several surveys and studies regarding insurance decisions that consumers' 
insurance decisions is affected by the perceived risk, and these decisions are inconsistent 
with basic principles of probability. McClelland et al. (1993) constructed an experiment 
 
23 
where a Vickrey auction was used to investigate insurance purchase behavior in the 
presence of low-probability risk. The results in the experiments reveal that people tend to 
employ either one of the two opposite strategies when confronted with low-probability 
hazards: ignoring it or worrying too much about it. Neither Johnson et al or McClelland 
et al. however, provided further explanations for these distorted perceptions of risks 
during the insurance decision making process. Experimental results in Shapira and 
Venezia’s research (2008) indicated that anchoring heuristic principles is an explanation 
for this misperception of risks in insurance buying. The people tend to anchor on the size 
of the deductible but fail to adjust price upward effectively to consider the fact that they 
just own a little chance to claim the deductible, which distort the judgment in their 
payments. Galarza and Carter (2010) found evidence of the "hot-hand"8 effect in their 
analysis that insurance buyers tend to underestimate the autocorrelation of the sequence 
of "bad" years. In Galarza and Carter’s study on the full-coverage insurance policy, it is 
found that amateur subjects are prone to underestimate the value of a deductible policy. 
Research on Crop Insurance Demand 
In the United States, the federal government started to provide farmers with risk 
management programs in the 1930’s.  In the last decades, several changes in insurance 
legislation have resulted in the steady growth in federal crop insurance participation.  
Goodwin (1993) established an empirical model to investigate factors which 
affect the demand for insurance by using county data in Ohio. The results suggested that 
                                                 
8 Given the description of the “hot-hand” effect in their article, the phenomenon of this 
“hot hand” is essentially consistent with gambler’s fallacy which is in accordance with 
foresaid definitions of hot hand and gambler’s fallacy. 
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raising premium rates might aggravate the severity of adverse selection9 problems and 
greatly increase the possibility of inflating the industry loss ratio since low loss-risks 
enjoy a significantly more elastic demand than high loss-risks. Smith and Baquet (1996) 
modelled Montana wheat farmers’ participation decisions and coverage-level selections 
separately and found that increases in premium rates do not exert an apparent effect on 
participation but materially depress the coverage level. Another comment based on the 
results is that increasing overall premium rates inefficiently reduce the loss ratios as 
adverse selection would limit its efficacy, just like what Goodwin (1993) suggested 
above. Coble et al. (1996) empirically made use of farm-level panel data to identify what 
effects certain variables, especially the variance of return in insurance, have on insurance 
demand. Their estimation results indicated that growers who are willing to receive 
frequent indemnities with smaller coverage are expected to more readily be insured than 
those who like indemnities that are rare but large. Serra et al. (2003) conducted research 
on changes in demand for crop insurance during the 1990’s. A basket of variables, 
including chemical input use, wealth of farms, and expected net income per acre, were 
put in the right-hand side of the regression model to explain the insurance demand. 
Focusing on the demand elasticity they conclude that the crop insurance purchase 
decision represents an inelastic response to premium rates changes. Sherrick (2004) 
carried out a mail survey of Midwestern U.S. farmers and analyze personal, business and 
other factors influencing crop insurance purchase decisions. The results revealed that 
farmers who are more highly leveraged, less wealthy, and operate larger farms with 
                                                 
9 The adverse selection refers to a phenomenon that individuals with larger risk of loss tend to buy more 
insurance. In the case of crop insurance, farmers with larger risk of loss are willing to buy insurance so as 
to insurance companies potentially undertake more financial risks. 
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higher perceived risks show a higher likelihood of crop insurance purchase and are more 
willing to run business under revenue protection versus yield protection. Shaik et al. 
(2008) conducted a survey in four states on four main crops: corn, soybeans, cotton and 
grain sorghum to study the decision whether to purchase yield or revenue crop insurance. 
The elasticity of yield insurance demand estimated in this study is -0.40, consistent with 
the estimates in prior literature and the elasticity for revenue demand insurance is 
estimated to be slightly higher (-0.88). Their results also showed that farmers who have a 
high expectation of yields or revenues are less likely to purchase insurance products.  
These articles mentioned here, despite diversities in their explanatory variables, 
all analyze the insurance demand in terms of objective properties, like farmland size, 
farmer’s initial wealth and premium rate across insurance programs. None of the studies, 
however, attempts to explain the demand from an individual insurance buyer’s 




CHAPTER III  
CONCEPTURAL FRAMEWORK 
Conceptual Model 
Participation in a crop insurance program could be viewed as a dichotomous 
choice, whether to be insured or uninsured.  Under this view the alternative coverage 
levels are disregarded. It is assumed that farmers are expected utility maximizers. An 
individual farmer will choose by comparing the expected utility with insurance, IiEU  to 
the expected utility without insurance NiEU . Since farmers’ risk preferences and 
perceptions are difficult to be measured directly, certain observable factors influencing 
the distribution and the evaluation of expected utility are used to address the choice 
problem. The model of crop insurance participation put forward by Coble et al. (1996) is 
used. The expected utility of being insured IiEU or not being insured NiEU could be 
written as functions of a vector of factors, 
  (3.1) 
  (3.2) 
where Nβ  is a vector of estimated impacts from the influencing factors for farmers that 
do not purchase insurance, Iβ is a vector of estimated impacts from influencing factors 
for farmers that purchase insurance, ix is a vector of influencing factors on individual i . 
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The expected utility difference between the two choices, insured and uninsured, could be 
expressed as, 
  (3.3) 
              
where ( )I N   λ β β . A rational individual decides to purchase insurance if
0Ii NiEU EU  ; otherwise no purchase is made. 
A further examination of insurance purchase decision is needed to determine 
variables in ix vector. The expected utility for the insured and uninsured situations can be 
written as follows, 
  (3.4) 
And 
  (3.5) 
where ( )MR  stands for market return, ( )I  is an indemnity function,  is the premium, 
A  is planted acres, 0W represents initial wealth, and ( )g  is a probability density function 
of , a random state of nature, and note that * means the state of nature which results in 
a guaranteed level of yield. Market return is equal to market price times yield, minus cost. 
Here market return and indemnity are both functions of . 
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Based on equations (4) and (5), Coble et al. (1996) constructed an optimal 
participation choice model for a risk-averse person where the choice variable is a 
function of parameters including wealth, moments of the random variables ( )MR  and
( )I  , and individual’s risk preference: 
  (3.6) 
where ( )i MR and ( )i RI  are respectively the moments of individual i ’s market return 
distribution and return to insurance ( ( )RI I    ); r is the risk-aversion coefficient, 
determined by Arrow-Pratt absolute risk-aversion function. 
Optimal risk-taking behavior relies on both risk preference and risk perception. 
The individual risk preference is measured by risk aversion coefficient r  and initial 
wealth 0W 10. The individual risk perception of risk, especially of crop revenue in my 
experiment, is determined by subjective probability of random revenue. When we 
examine individual purchase choice, a farmer would formulate their own subjective 
distribution of revenue to predict the risks of revenue of loss. In equation (6) ( )i MR , the 
moments of market return11 or revenue, are the influencing variables. Therefore, the 
subjective moments of revenue, mean Rev and standard deviation Rev , are used to 
explain the consumer behavior in crop insurance purchase in my case as well. In the 
experiment, a subjective probability of revenue loss prob  accounting for the moments of 
revenue was recorded from subjects and included into the regression function.   
                                                 
10 The initial wealth are assumed the same across individuals in my experiment, so it is not regarded as a 
factor variable in the conceptual model. 
11 Market return of crop, expressed as crop yield times crop price, is an equivalent to crop revenue 
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Equation (6) is foundation of this research. As discussed above, prob is the key 
factor variable in my conceptual model. Therefore, a model allowing for behavioral 
anomalies which are reflected in the variances of subjective probability distribution of 
revenue is formulated  
  (3.7) 
Where purchase choice C is binary category, buying or not buying. The purchase 
choice is a function of risk preference12, probability of loss prob and cognitive bias 
factors streaks .  prob is the subjective probability of loss or revenue risks which is an 
equivalent of ( )i MR in equation (3.6). streaks is created to account for the effect of 
cognitive bias on purchase choice. 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis One: Hot (Cold) Hand Effect. 
If the revenues have been above the indemnity level over recent years, farmers are 
less likely to purchase insurance in the next year based on their belief of “hot hand”.  
Conversely, if the revenues have been already standing below the indemnity level for 
years, farmers are more likely to purchase insurance in the next year based on the belief 
of “cold hand”.  
Since the revenue is on a good streak, farmers would prefer to think that the 
revenue outcomes have a “hot hand” and they expect a good harvest in the next year. 
                                                 
12 Theoretically individual risk preference is the influencing factor of purchase choice. But it is not included 
into the independent variables of the regression empirically since the regression was ran individually and 
risk preference keeps constant within individual. 
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Importantly, this reflects a perceived positive autocorrelation of revenues when in fact 
there is none or a higher positive autocorrelation in case of low positive autocorrelation.  
A “hot hand” effect occurs when people’s subjective probability for satisfactory revenue 
in next year is increased because of their consideration of a series of successive years of 
satisfactory revenue in a short term as a trend which is believed to maintain in the next 
year.  However, in fact this is simply an occasion of well-ordered randomness. If the 
revenue is on a bad streak, on the other hand, an expectation of positive autocorrelation 
would lead farmers to increase the probability of loss in the next year and tend to buy 
more insurance. 
Hypothesis Two: Gambler’s Fallacy 
If the revenues have been below the indemnity level consecutively in recent years, 
farmers are less likely to buy insurance in the next year. Or on the other side, farmers are 
more likely to buy insurance in the next year if the revenues have been above the 
indemnity level for several years. 
Since the past years’ revenues have been below farmers’ expectations, they have a 
tendency to believe that they cannot be so unlucky that a bad outcome will occur in the 
subsequent year. Conversely, if they have been experiencing a streak of years with good 
revenues, they would suppose that good luck is running out and bad revenue is probably 
around the corner. 
Data Analysis 
Both descriptive statistics and regression analysis were employed in this study. 
Descriptive statistics such as means, frequencies, line chart and bar chart show a general 
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description of subjects’ performance in the experiment such as their understanding of 
histogram and autocorrelation, their perception on potential revenue risk and their 
willingness to purchase insurance. A binary logit regression analysis was used to examine 
the subjective probability and cognitive bias that influence subjects’ decisions to engage 
in insurance protection.  
Binary logistic model 
In many cases, the researchers generate models where the dependent variable is 
categorical. In my study, the insurance purchase decision is a well-explained example 
which only involves two choices, buy it or not. The estimation method of Ordinary Least 
Square fails to provide reliable estimates in a regression with a binary dependent variable. 
Therefore, logistic regression could be considered as a feasible approach which takes into 
consideration that the dependent variable is categorical. 
The basic model of the logit regression is expressed as follow: 
  (3.8) 
Similarly, 
  (3.9) 
       
Dividing (1) by (2),  
  (3.10) 
 
32 
Where iP is the probability that iC takes the value of 1 and 1 iP is the probability that iC
takes the value of 0. kiX is the influencing factor and e is the exponential constant.  
In my study the dependent variable is to buy insurance or not, taking value either 
1 meaning willing to buy or 0 meaning unwilling to buy. As shown in (3.7), the 
influencing factors in the insurance demand regression include subjective probability and 
streak factors: 
  (3.11) 
         
where i is an error term subject to a normal distribution. 
Experimental Economics 
As discussed above, many researchers, like Clotfelter and Cook (1993), Ayton 
and Fischer (2004), and Burns and Corpus (2004), made use of real gambles to design 
experiments for pure cognitive research in psychology. Some researchers, based on the 
needs in their study field, tended to construct specified contexts in experiments to explore 
how cognitive thinking affect their decision making in the real world, like Camerer and 
Kunreuther (1989), Mcclelland et al. (1993). In terms of the goal in this research, the 
effect of certain cognitive biases on crop insurance purchase was to be investigated.  In 
our experiment I created a crop insurance market where an actuarially fair priced 
insurance was offered to protect from revenue risks and subjects’ willingness to pay for 
the insurance was elicited. 
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Lab experiments have been gaining increasing popularity among economists in 
recent decades and hundreds of articles based upon experimental methods were published 
each year (Levitt and List, 2007). Why would researchers like to make use of 
experimental methods to study research topics? In lab experiments, investigators can be 
able to influence the sets including prices, budgets and environment, and measure the 
effect of every single factor on behavior under the laboratory experimental context with 
the help of ceteris paribus observations of individual agents in the experiment (Levitt and 
List, 2007). It is difficult, for example, to observe individual’s house insurance purchase 
behavior over many years and further to examine the effects of a catastrophe occurred in 
this year on the next year’s insurance participation. However, it is comparatively easy to 
offer participants in the lab experiment exposures to risky situation in continuous periods 
and obtain their behavioral observations.  
On the other hand, laboratory experiments have their shortcomings. One common 
criticism on laboratory methodology is that participants cannot adequately take a part in 
the experiment where the context is not sufficiently realistic, especially in terms of the 
effects of financial incentives on experiment (McClelland et al. 1993). For instance, the 
monetary gains and losses in the laboratory are trivial compared to, for instance, the real 
potential losses living in flood-prone area when investigating flood insurance purchase 
behavior. Nevertheless, there are some observations in the laboratory indicating that 
small monetary flows are capable of eliciting their true evaluation of risky events. 
Camerer and Hogarth (1999) discussed the effects of financial incentives depend on what 
the task is; in some tasks incentives increase performance but in many tasks incentives do 
not matter. They further stated that the scope of financial incentives does not change 
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subjects’ behaviors in a substantive way. Dickhaut et al. (2013) reported evidence that 
one can use low stakes experiments to produce choices that well-reflect decisions made 
in that same environment where stakes are much higher.  
Other than the concerns about the effect of the scale of monetary incentives on 
experimental results, a found-money effect also distorts the outcomes of experiments 
(Laury and Holt, 2008). In Laury and Holt’s experiment, to mitigate the found-money 
effect and make the loss more real to subjects, the participants were allowed to earn their 
initial endowments before they faced the risk task. Morone and Ozdemir (2006) 
employed the same strategy in their study in an effort to eliminate the effect of found-
money.  
A strong attribute of laboratory experiment is that an experiment conducted in a 
lab offers participants a relative calm environment and repeated experience with a single 
specified risk. This valuable idea is put forward by McClelland et al. (1993) and they 
explain that if subjects do not have the cognitive capability to deal with risk problems, we 
are unlikely to exclude the possibility that they will struggle cognitively to make a 
decision whether to worry about a risky event like a hazardous facility in their 
neighborhood under a more highly emotional circumstance. Even though laboratory 
experiments have advantages and disadvantages that we should take into consideration, in 
the final analysis, the only one core and fundamental question we are concerned with is 
whether the findings from the lab are reliable enough to be generalized into the real world 
and provide credible justifications outside of the laboratory.  Numerous studies suggested 
that if various dimensions in laboratory experiments are manageable, the generalizability 




THE CONDUCT OF THE EXPERIMENT AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
This research was approved by the Institutional Review Board (14-048) for 
research of human subjects at Mississippi State University (see Appendix A). Our 
subjects were junior or senior undergraduate students and graduate students recruited 
from agricultural economics, business and science classes at Mississippi State University. 
The experiment is Excel (Microsoft) based. All possible choices were recorded on 
the spreadsheets. After all decisions in all the rounds were made, the final score and 
accompanying payment were displayed at the top of the spreadsheet. At this time subjects 
also receive payments from the experimenters. Subjects were told that individual 
outcomes are independent of choices made by others. Each participant receives a 
payment for attending the experiment, regardless of participation level. 
In this experiment, respondents participated in two consecutive games. To reduce 
the possibility of an anchoring effect, the order of the two games was changed each 
session. A total of 9 sessions were conducted and 96 subjects took part in this experiment. 
Each session began with an introductory talk (see Appendix A). The experimental 
introductions were read aloud and explained in detail. After the introduction, each 
individual completes a form of a Holt-Laury lottery choice task ((Holt and Laury, 2002) 
and then began the game. 
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Holt-Laury Lottery Choice Task 
In Holt-Laury lottery choice task, subjects made 10 choices between option A and 
Option B and were to be paid one of the two amounts. In each question, Option A has a 
smaller variation and is considered “safe”, while Option B with a larger variation is 
considered “risky”. Each question differs in the probability of winning bigger rewards. A 
more detailed summary of the two options can be found at Table 4.1. Finally a real 10-
sided die was thrown twice: the first throw determines which question would be used for 
the second throw and then the second throw decides which prize is to be paid. In question 
1, for example, the higher prize is paid if the throw of die is 1 and the lower prize is paid 
when any other throw appears. For question 2, the higher prize is paid when the throw is 
1 or 2 while the lower prize is paid for 3 through 10. The point at which subjects shift 
from "safe" to "risky" in lottery can be used to elicit their range of risk aversion. (For 















10% chance of $10.00, 
90% chance of $8.00 
10% chance of $19.00 




20% chance of $10.00, 
80% chance of $8.00 
20% chance of $19.00 




30% chance of $10.00, 
70% chance of $8.00 
30% chance of $19.00, 




40% chance of $10.00, 
60% chance of $8.00 
40% chance of $19.00,             




50% chance of $10.00, 
50% chance of $8.00 
50% chance of $19.00, 




60% chance of $10.00, 
40% chance of $8.00 
60% chance of $19.00, 




70% chance of $10.00, 
30% chance of $8.00 
70% chance of $19.00, 




80% chance of $10.00, 
20% chance of $8.00 
80% chance of $19.00, 




90% chance of $10.00, 
10% chance of $8.00 
90% chance of $19.00, 




100% chance of $10.00, 
0% chance of $8.00 
100% chance of $19.00, 
0% chance of $1.00 
 
 
Table 4.2 shows expected payoff corresponding to each option of each question. 










Option B Expected payoff difference 
1 $8.20 $2.80 $5.40 
2 $8.40 $4.60 $3.80 
3 $8.60 $6.40 $2.20 
4 $8.80 $8.20 $0.60 
5 $9.00 $10.00 -$1.00 
6 $9.20 $11.80 -$2.60 
7 $9.40 $13.60 -$4.20 
8 $9.60 $15.40 -$5.80 
9 $9.80 $17.20 -$7.40 
10 $10.00 $19.00 -$9.00 
 
Two different experimental methods were used in two separate games. The first 
game is a dichotomous choice task, and the second one is a modified experiment adapted 
from a paper by Offerman and Sonnemans (2004).  
Game One: Dichotomous Choice Task 
In this task, each subject played a role of a farmer growing a crop. Like most crop 
farmers, subjects cannot control either weather, which has an effect on the yield, or the 
market price. The cost of planting crops was $90 per acre and the expected revenue was 
$100 per acre. Each farmer grew 100 acres as a total. Therefore, they were expected to 
earn $1000 in one harvest year. 
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To help subjects understand the revenue risks of crop production, they were 
presented with a histogram of 1000 observations (figure 4.113) from the true distribution 
of revenue outcomes and were informed that the underlying distribution remains constant 
throughout the game. The outcome is distributed normally with a mean of 100 and a 
standard deviation of 20, but this piece of information was not revealed to subjects.  
 
Figure 4.1 The histogram of 1000 revenue observations presented to subjects in Game 
One 
 
A crop insurance contract allowed subjects to avoid revenue loss. The coverage 
level was $90/acre; if the revenue fell below $90/acre in a year, the insurance would 
make up the gap between 90 and actual revenue with an indemnity when farms already 
held the insurance policy. The premium in this game, an unsubsidized actuarially fair 
                                                 
13 The horizontal axis shows the revenue ranges; the vertical axis shows the percentages.  
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premium rate, was based on the 1000 revenue observations previously observed. The 








  , only if 90nrevenue   (4.1) 
Subjects began this game by answering a probability question,  
“What is the probability of collecting insurance (the probability that revenue falls 
below $90 per acre) do you think it would be in the next year”  
and then need to answer a purchase choice question  
“Whether or not are you willing to buy the insurance?”  
Subject could make use of original prior information (the revenue histogram), and 
updated their prior information (drawn revenue observations in each period) and 
perceptions of losses and then maximize their expected profits through buying insurance 
given an actuarially fair price. Then at the end of each period, an observation of revenue 
was randomly selected from the distribution and the insurance would cover the losses of 
those who held the contract if the actual revenue was below the deductible level ($90 per 
acre). A total of 50 rounds of choices were observed for each of the subjects. Each 1000 
tokens earned in the experiment would be exchanged with one dollar in real cash. 
In both games, the payoff function for each individual can be expressed as follow, 
 
[ ( )]                                   if 
                           
{ [( ) )}                       if 
t t
t t t t
A r c r r
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   
 (4.2) 
where is A the fixed plant acres; tr is the random crop revenue in period t ; c is the cost of 
holding an insurance contract (in this game, c is a pre-specified price as premium rate); 
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r is the deductible level of revenue. t is a binary choice variable in period t ; 1 denotes 
holding an insurance policy and 0 means not. 
Game Two: Modified Offerman & Sonnemans’ Experiment Task 
In Game Two, I used Offerman and Sonnemans’ (2004) methodology in the crop 
insurance experiment. (For more detailed experiment instruction, see Appendix A) 
In this task, each subject still played a role of farmer and made a dichotomous 
choice to buy insurance contracts in each period. Every subject was growing 100 acres of 
the crop with a cost of $90 per acre and expected revenue of $100 per acre. If yields or 
market prices were low enough subjects would lose money. Likewise, an insurance 
policy with a coverage level of $90 was provided to protect them from potential losses 
caused by low revenues.   
What differs from the first dichotomous choice task is that, in each period subjects 
were shown different series of 21 observations that were either correlated or independent 
with a 50%-50% chance (but the subjects were not told whether the series of randomly 
selected revenues are independent or correlated). That is, if revenues were independent or 
uncorrelated across time, then the revenue for this year would have no relationship with 
next year’s revenue.  However, if revenues were correlated then if this year’s revenue 
was above average there is a 70% chance next year’s revenue would be above average.  
Conversely, if this year’s revenue was below average there would be a 70% chance next 
year’s revenue would be below average. The next is how the uncorrelated and especially 
correlated revenue series were generated. 
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Revenue data generation 
There are two types of revenues in this game; one is from normal distribution with 
a mean of 100 and a standard deviation of 20 (game one) and the other is transformed 
from this normal distribution with the same mean and standard deviation but with auto-
correlation across periods. Based on the instruction (see Appendix A) “the next 
observation of revenue has a chance of 0.7 to be above the previous one”, we used a 
process called “first-order autoregressive process”, denoted as AR1 in time series 
(Gujarati, 1995). 
A first-order autoregression (AR1) could be expressed as the following difference 
equation, 
  (4.3) 
where { t } is a white noise sequence satisfying the following three conditions: ( ) 0tE   ,
2 2( )tE    and ( ) 0  for ttE     . In our case, it is assumed that  t is normally 
distributed with a normal distribution with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 2 . tY  
is the crop revenue in period t  and 1tY  denotes the crop revenue in period 1t  .  , which 
is according to our experimental setting, is 0.3 which is less than 1, so that tY can be 
considered as a covariance-stationary process. Based on the properties of difference 
equation, equation (4.2) can be transformed as  
  (4.4) 




Taking expectations of (4.4), we can see that 
 ( ) [c/(1- )] 0 0tE Y      (4.5) 
So we can say that the mean of a stationary AR(1) process is 
 / (1 )AR c    (4.6) 
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  (4.7) 
Since this stationary AR(1) process is based on the normal distribution with 
100N  and 20N  , in our case, the revenue series with correlation and that without 
correlation share the same values of mean and standard deviation. In other words, 
 100N AR    (4.8) 
 and 
2 2
0 20N    (4.9) 
By substituting (4.8) into equation (4.6), the value of c is equal to 30. Substitute 
(4.8) into (4.6),  is 20 5.1 , 
 130 0.7 20 .51t t tY Y e    , where (0,  1)te  (4.10) 
Hence, 50 different series of 21 observations with correlation were generated one 
by one, according to equation (4.10). 
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The 21 observations would be shown in a form of “20-1”. At first, the computer 
drew a series of twenty years of crop revenues (“20”) from whatever the revenues were, 
either independent or correlated, for subjects to observe. (Figure 4.2) The decision 
makers observed the revenue series and then needed to answer the following two 
probability questions 
“What is the chance that this crop’s revenue is correlated across time?”  
“Given the series you are observing, what is the chance that you will collect an 
indemnity if you purchase the insurance policy?” 
and then decided whether to buy the insurance contract. At last the year’s actual revenue 
from the series was shown after subjects had answered those three questions.  
 





Quadratic scoring rule 
The second source of earning from this game was based on each subject’s 
estimate of the probability that revenues were correlated across time. The payoff was 
determined by the quadratic scoring rule. The quadratic scoring rule works in this manner. 
Assuming that S is the participant’s reported probability that outcomes are correlated, the 
payoff is 210,000 S points if revenues are uncorrelated across time and is
2200*S S
points if correlated. 
As an incentive-compatible mechanism to elicit beliefs, the quadratic scoring rule 
incentivizes subjects to truthfully reveal their subjective probability (Sonnemans and 
Offerman, 2001). Clements and Harvey (2010) also used the quadratic scoring rule for 
probability forecasts. Vanberg (2008) used this rule to investigate the effect of exchange 
of promises on cooperative behavior in experimental games. In this experiment, subjects 
were provided with a payoff table based on the formulas above, but the math formulas 
were not shown to the subjects. The table displayed each payoff corresponding to 
probabilities in the interval from 0% to 100% both when revenues are correlated and 
when revenues are uncorrelated. Under this scoring rule, the best strategy for subjects is 
to report beliefs truthfully.  
The payoff table (table 4.3) shows how many points the subjects would obtain 
based on the reported probability if the revenues are “correlated’ or “uncorrelated”. At 
the end of experiment, the earned points were exchanged for dollars (the exchange rate is 
8,000 points = one dollar and subjects were instructed with the exchange rate in advance). 
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Finally, subjects earned the revenues from harvesting the crop. The average 
revenue per acre is $100 but it costs $90 to grow. The payoff function in this game is 
shown above as equation (4.1).  














































































EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS  
Experiment Results 
In total 96 subjects participated in this experiment. 92 valid samples in Game One 
and 95 valid samples in Game Two were collected for analysis14.  
General description of risk preference 
At the beginning of the experiment, I collected the risk preference data of each 
individual, by the use of Holt-Laury Lottery Choice task (see more in Appendix A). A 
total number of 96 samples were obtained and the number of Option A selections was 
calculated individually. Table 5.3 displays the relative risk aversion coefficient as an 
indicator of individual’s risk preference (Holt and Laury, 2002). When looking at the 
lottery choices, I found that some of them failed to understand the instruction well so as 
to behave in an irrational way of switching choices from option A to option B and then 
back to A at least once. A value of 99 was assigned to those irrational choices. Therefore 
a distribution of risk preference across individuals was given in Figure 5.6. There are 18 
subjects who were given a 99 risk preference indicating these subjects exhibited irrational 
                                                 
14 There are 96 subjects participating in this experiment. A subject who was found cheated in the 
experiment was dropped out from the valid samples. As I mentioned, the order of two games were 
switched in each section. There are 3 subjects who only finished Game Two and then left without 
completion of the whole experiment. 92 samples in Game One were collected. 
 
48 
behaviors somehow. Most of the subjects’ numbers of Option A are ranging from 4 to 6. 
Combined with Table 5.3, it implies that most subjects in the sample show a risk neural, 
mildly risk averse or risk averse attitude towards risk. The most common response was to 
switch with the 6th choice which is defined as risk averse. 
Table 5.1 Risk Aversion Coefficient 
Number of 
safe choices 












Middle point of 
relative risk aversion 
Risk preference 
classification 
0-1 -1.76a < rr < -0.93 -1.365 Highly risk loving 
2 -0.97 < rr < -0.49 -0.73 Very risk loving 
3 -0.49 < rr <-0.13 -0.31 Risk loving 
4 -0.13 < rr < 0.19 0.03 Risk neutral 
5 0.19 < rr < 0.48 0.335 Slightly risk averse 
6 0.48< rr < 0.78 0.63 Risk averse 
7 0.78< rr < 1.13 0.955 Very risk averse 
8 1.13< rr < 1.60 1.365 Highly risk averse 
9-10 1.60< rr < 2.2 a 1.9 Stay in bed 




Figure 5.1 The distribution of risk preference across individuals 
 
General description of reported probability 
In Game One, subjects needed to answer the question in each period that “what do 
you think the probability of collecting insurance (the probability that revenue falls below 
$90 per acre) it would be next year”. The probability distribution shown to subjects 
throughout Game One shows that 33% is the correct probability that the revenue would 
fall below $90 per acre (Figure 5.1). To measure their understanding of histogram and 
assessment of probability in Game One, a scoring rule (equation 5.1) were calculated for 
each subject. The density distribution is given below (Figure 5.2). The formula of this 
scoring rule is expressed as  
  (5.1) 
where piit is reported probability. Therefore, the lower score the subjects gained the 
better understanding of histogram they have. The distribution of the calculated scores 
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across individuals is plotted in figure 5.2. There is one subject who reported 33% 
probability across all rounds and another three subjects reported the same probability 
below 40% in all rounds which implies that these subjects had a clear understanding of 
this histogram. Among them 21 subjects (over one firth of samples) gained a score larger 
than 219 meaning that the positive or negative deviations from 33% of their reported 
probability are on average more than 30 percentage points in each period. So apparently 
they did not understand the histogram or the revenue risks adequately. The table 5.2 
shows the average reported probability of loss across individuals is 46.61, which means 
that the subjects overestimated the revenue loss risks. 
 





Figure 5.3 The distribution of score across individuals in Game One 
 
In Game Two, we already have the quadratic scoring rule to measure their 
evaluation of probability of correlation. In each round, subjects gained a score and then 
the scores in all 50 rounds were averaged: 
  (5.2) 
where itqsr is the point subjects obtained through the quadratic scoring rule based on the 
reported probability of the revenue series being correlated. The higher tqsr is, the better 
their assessment of correlation probability is. In Figure 5.3, the distribution of scores 
across individuals in Game Two is negatively skewed, which shows that more of them 
had a relatively good accuracy of probability of the revenue series being correlated. 
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Table 5.2 Summary Statistics of Scores and Probability 
Variable 
Sample Mean 
(s.d.) Min Max # of obs 
Reported probability 
of loss in Game One 46.61(22.40) 0 100 4600 
Reported probability 
of loss in Game Two 46.12(23.29) 0 100 4750 
Score in Game One 162.16(90.20) 0 382.00 92 
Score in Game Two 69.42(4.52) 53.17 76.51 95 
 
 
Figure 5.4 The distribution of score across individuals in Game Two 
 
Let us look at their performance of the subjects’ assessment of correlation in 
another perspective. The reported correlation probability larger than 50% is labeled as 
“perceived correlation” while probability less than 50% is “perceived correlation” 
(probability equal to 50% were deleted due to subjects’ uncertainty in perception). 4048 
observations were used to design the Table 5.2 where the percentages that the perceived 
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correlation was right or wrong conditional on that the series was in fact correlated or 
uncorrelated are displayed. Some interesting relationships are found as follows, 
1. Subjects generally did a good job, with more correct answers (61.07%) than 
wrong answers (38.93%). The percentages of perceived correlation and no-
correlation are 44.07% and 55.93% respectively, close to the true percentages of 
correlation and no-correlation.  
2. The fact that the perceived percentage of no-correlation (55.93%) is larger than 
that of correlation (44.07%) indicates that subjects were not likely to overestimate 
the probability of correlation but underestimate it although the instruction says 
that there is a 50-50 chance to be either correlated or uncorrelated.  
3. Furthermore, the percentage that subjects’ perception of correlation when revenue 
data was uncorrelated is the lowest one (17.39%) among those four percentages, 
which confirms the foresaid argument: subjects were not inclined to overestimate 
the correlation probability.  
4. The accuracy of probability perception is 55.3% when the series is correlated 
while accuracy is 66.4% when it is uncorrelated, which indicates that subjects are 
better at identifying uncorrelated series than correlated series.  
Table 5.3  Subjects’ correlation perceptions compared to true correlation 
  
True   
  
correlation no-correlation total 
perceived correlation 26.68% 17.39% 
44.07% 
no-correlation 21.54% 34.39% 55.93% 




General description of purchase choices 
As shown in table 5.2, subjects purchased the insurance contract on average 
27.536 periods in 50 periods in Game One. The min and max are 0 and 50. In Game Two 
subjects bought insurance in average 26.80 rounds out of 50 rounds. The min and max 
are 2 and 50. Note that 2 subjects bought no insurance in 50 periods but 2 bought it in 
every round of Game One; while no subjects completed 50 rounds without purchasing 
insurance in Game Two and 2 subjects purchased insurance in every round. From the 
results of normality in table 5.5, the Shapiro-Wilk test shows that the distribution 
purchase choice in Game Two is normally distributed while Game One is not and 
negatively skewed.  
Table 5.4 Summary Statistics of Purchase Choices 
Variable 
Sample Mean 
(s.d.) Min Max # of obs 
The Count of 
Purchase Periods for 
individuals in Game1 
27.536(13.144) 0 50 92 
The Count of 
Purchase Periods for 
individuals in Game2 





Table 5.5 Normality test for the purchase choices across individuals in both games 
 Game One Game Two 
Test Statistics P Value Statistics P Value 
Shapiro-Wilk 0.961768 0.0085 0.98407 0.3044 
 
 






Figure 5.6 The distribution of count of purchase choices across individuals in Game 
Two 
 
Based on the record of the number of purchase choices across individuals in both 
games, it is interesting to examine whether there is a distinctive difference of buying 
behavior between two games. The Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum and t-test are used to 
address this issue (Table 5.5). Since Game Two has 3 more samples than Game One, 




Table 5.6 Wilcoxon Signed Rank Sum Test 
Test Statistics P Value 
Student’s t 0.668317 0.5056 
Sign 1.5 0.8323 
Signed Rank 200 0.4160 
 
The signed rank sum test result shows no statistically significant difference of the 
number of purchase choices within two games. This could be concluded that subjects 
demonstrated an equal willingness to purchase insurance between two games, although 
with difference experimental settings. 
Data Analysis 
Probability regression 
In both games, subjects were asked to report the probabilities that the revenue will 
fall below $90 per acre in each period. The regression model trying to examine how the 
subjects assess the probability of loss is estimated for each individual subject in both 
games:  
  (5.3) 
                    
where itprobch is the difference in subject i ’s reported probability between the period t
and the previous one period 1t  ; 1itprobch is one period lag of itprobch , the difference 
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in subject i ’s reported probability between the period 1t  and the previous one period 
2t  ; 2itprobch is two periods lag of probchand 3itprobch is three periods lag of 
itprobch  and  it is an error term subject to a normal distribution. So the regression 
model can also be expressed as follow,  
 (5.4) 
     
where ,i tprob is subject i ’s reported probability in period t and , 1i tprob  is subject i ’s 




Probability regression for Game One 
Table 5.7 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability 
Regression in Game One 
Variable Name Definition Sample Mean (s.d.) Min Max 
probability change 
The difference of 
reported   probability 
between the current 
period t and the 
previous one period 
1t  ; , , 1i t i tprob prob   
0.14(20.58) -100 100 
probability change1 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
1t  and the period
2t  ;
, 1 , 2i t i tprob prob   
0.12(20.43) -100 100 
probability change2 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
2t  and the period
3t  ;
, 2 , 3i t i tprob prob   
0.11(20.47) -100 100 
probability change3 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
3t   and the period
4t  ;
, 3 , 4i t i tprob prob   
0.13(20.47) -100 100 
 
In Game One, there are 8 subjects who reported the same probability of loss 
across all the rounds. Due to the lack of sufficient variation in the dependent variable, 
only 84 samples are used in the regression for Game One. The regression results are 
following in Table 5.7.  
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Table 5.8 Results from Probability Regression in Game One 
Variable Name 
The number of significant 




probability change1 67 
0 
67 
probability change2 57 
0 
57 
probability change3 27 
1 
26 
Note: A10% significance level is used 
As we can see, one period lag and two periods of lag of probability change are 
both significant in more than half of samples and all have a negative sign.  
This strong significance of negative signs in one period and two periods lag 
variables are telling us that, if there is an increase in the reported probability of loss in 
this period compared to the last period, then the reported probability will either increase 
but in a smaller scale or even decrease in the next first period and the probability in the 
next second period will probably increase a further smaller scale or drop down.  
Conversely, if the reported probability in the current period decreases compared 
to the last period, the probability in the next first period will either decrease but in a 
smaller scale or even bouncing up. The probability in the next second period will 
probably decrease in an even smaller scale or even spring back up.  
The reported probability is bouncing up and down and subjects were seemingly 
looking for the equilibrium of probability of loss. I randomly selected the reported 
probability of loss data from 4 subjects whose regression models have significant 




Figure 5.7 Reported probability of loss from 4 randomly drawn subjects who all have 
significant lag probability change variables 
 
Different colors represent different subjects’ reported probability of loss. All of 
these four individuals, either those who changed the probability in a strong manner like 
subject 4 or those who changed in a mild manner like subject 43, indeed had the reported 
probability bounce up and down frequently. However, it is important to evaluate this 
behavior given the parent probability of loss is 33%. It can be an interpretation that 
subjects were seeking the equilibrium through updating their probability round by round. 




Probability regression for Game Two 
In Game Two, the same regression model is estimated, 
  (5.5) 
                   
Table 5.9 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Probability 
Regression in Game Two 
Variable Name Definition Sample Mean (s.d.) Min Max 
probability change 
The difference of 
reported   probability 
between the current 
period t and the 
previous one period 
1t  ; , , 1i t i tprob prob   
-0.04(26.90) -100 100 
probability change1 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
1t  and the period
2t  ;
, 1 , 2i t i tprob prob   
-0.15(27.01) -100 100 
probability change2 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
2t  and the period
3t  ;
, 2 , 3i t i tprob prob   
-0.51(26.92) -100 100 
probability change3 
The difference of 
reported probability 
between the period 
3t   and the period
4t  ;
, 3 , 4i t i tprob prob   
-0.26(27.04) -100 100 
 
There are two persons who reported the same probability of loss across the 
periods. Due to the lack of sufficient variation in dependent variable, 94 samples in the 
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end are used in the regression for Game Two. The regression results are following in 
Table 5.4.  
Table 5.10 Results of Probability Regression in Game Two 
Variable Name 
The number of significant 




probability change1 92 
0 
92 
probability change2 89 
0 
89 
probability change3 45 
0 
45 
Note: at a 10% significance level 
Game Two is similar to Game One in regards to the regression results: subjects 
changed their probability of loss up and down frequently. This is, however, reasonable in 
Game Two where subjects were experiencing randomly selected series of revenues in 
every round and started over to perceive the loss probability in the next round. Changing 
reported probability could be just a reflection of changing fundamental risk information.  
Demand regression 
Demand regression model for Game One15 
I utilized the logistic function to analyze the insurance demand. The regression 
model is represented as 
  (5.6) 
                                                 
15 I have also investigated a model including square terms of streak variables for a check a quadratic 




where the choice is equal to 1 for purchasing insurance and 0 for no insurance and  it
is an error term subject to a normal distribution. 
In the function above, itprobt is the subject i ’s reported probability that revenue in 
current period will be less than $90 per area. The variables goodyear and badyear are 
created to accounts for the effect of streaks of good and bad revenue years on insurance 
purchase choice, in order to test the hypothesis of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect. 
The values of goodyear  were generated in this manner: if the previous period is the third 
year in row when the revenue is larger than 90, the current period of goodyear would be 
set to 3; if the previous period is the fourth consecutive year when the revenue is larger 
than 90, the current period of goodyear would be set to 4, etc. The minimum and 
maximum value of goodyear is 0 and 6 respectively (See Table 5.7). Likewise, the 
variable badyear was generated in the same fashion. As its maximum value is 4 (See 
Table 5.7), it just has three levels, 0, 3 and 4. Since the maximum value of good streak 
variable is 6, the first 6 observations of goodyear were set to be missing for each 
individual. The first 4 observations of badyear were missing for each individual as well 
for the same reason. As to variable period , it refers to the cumulative amount of periods 
the subjects have been experiencing, in order to capture the learning process—see 
whether or not subjects were learning to purchase crop insurance as more rounds of the 




Table 5.11 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand 
Regression without Square Term in Game One 
Variable Name Definition Sample Mean (s.d.) Min Max 
purchase choice 
The purchase choice made by 
subjects, one for buying, zero 
for not buying 
0.55(0.50) 0 1 
prob 
The reported probability that 
revenue will fall below $90 per 
area in the current period 
46.61(22.40) 0 100 
goodyear 
The amount of consecutive bad 
years (>2) that subjects have 
been experiencing before the 
current period 
1.18(1.92) 0 6 
badyear 
The amount of consecutive bad 
years (>2) that subjects have 
been experiencing before the 
current period 
0.39(0.97) 0 4 
period 
The cumulative amount of 
periods that subjects have been 
experiencing 
24.50(14.43) 0 49 
 
4 samples in the pool have the same choice across the rounds. Due to a lack of 
sufficient variation in dependent variable in some samples, it ends up using 88 samples in 




Table 5.12 Results from Demand Regression without Square Term in Game One 
Variable Name 
The number of 
significance out 






prob 45 42 3 
goodyear 9 3 6 
badyear 8 7 1 
period 19 15 
4 
Note: at 10% significance 
From the estimate results we can see that the reported probability variable is 
significant in over half of samples in most of which it is positive. It means that the 
probability of purchasing choice will increase as the probability of perception of loss 
rises, which makes sense. Neither of two streak variables looks statistically significant 
since no more than 10 are significant at 10% level for both of them, thereby rejecting the 
hypotheses of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect: the subjects in Game One did not 
exhibit the behaviors of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect when making decision to 
buy insurance. It is interesting to find that there are 15 samples out of 88, where there is a 
positive and significant period factor which indicates that subjects were learning to buy 
more insurance contracts in Game One as they had been experiencing more rounds. 
Demand regression model for Game Two 
 The demand regression in Game Two has similar factor variables as in Game 
One -- probability of loss, period, and streak variables (good streak and bad streak) to 
explain the insurance purchase choice. Since the two games have distinctive experimental 
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settings, the creations of streak variables were different. In Game Two, A new series of 
20 observations was provided in each period for subjects to observe and their probability 
perception would start over in the next period; while the histogram remained constant 
throughout the game and subjects updated their perceptions only by the new drawn 
revenue observation. Therefore, the streak variables are based upon the given 20 
observations in each round: if the 20th observation is the third consecutive good year that 
revenue is larger than 90, the value of goodyear would be set to 3; if the 20th is the fourth 
consecutive good year when the revenue is larger than 90, the current period of 
goodyear would be set to 4, etc. Likewise, the variable badyear was created in the same 
fashion. Additionally, the reported auto-correlation probability in Game Two was 
included in explanatory variables, just for a curiosity about its effect on purchase decision. 
Therefore, the demand regression model for Game Two is formulating as follow, 




Table 5.13 Definitions and Summary Statistics for Variables Used in Demand 
Regression in Game Two 
Variable Name Definition Sample Mean (s.d.) Min Max 
Purchase choice 
The purchase choice made by 
subjects, one for buying, zero for 
not buying 
0.54(0.50) 0 1 
prob 
The reported probability that 
revenue will fall below $90 per 
area in the current period 
46.12(23.29) 0 100 
goodyear 
The amount of consecutive good 
years (>2) that subjects have 
been experiencing before the last 
observation in the series shows 
up 
2.76(4.11) 0 16 
badyear 
The amount of consecutive bad 
years (>2) that subjects have 
been experiencing before the last 
observation in the series shows 
up 
0.22(1.08) 0 6 
proba 
The reported probability that the 
revenue series in the period is 
correlated 
46.44(25.11) 0 100 
period 
The cumulative amount of 
periods that subjects have been 
experiencing 
24.50(14.43) 1 49 
 
Since there are 3 subjects choosing either buying or not buying all the rounds, the 
lack of sufficient variation in dependent variable caused 92 samples to be used in the 




Table 5.14 Results from Demand Regression in Game Two 
Variable Name 
The number of 
significance out 






prob 63 61 2 
goodyear 2 1 1 
badyear 1 1 0 




Note: at 10% significance 
Both streak variables have no explanatory power in this model as well as in the 
regression of Game One. The fact of insignificance of streak variables rejects the 
hypotheses of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect: the subjects did not exhibit the 
behaviors of gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect when making decisions to buy 
insurance. The reported probability of loss is significant for nearly two thirds of samples 
and its positive sign implies that an increase in perceived probability of loss leads to a 
rise in the probability of demand for insurance policy. On the other hand, the probability 
of series being correlated is not statistically significant. Variable period is statistically 
significant in some samples but they split the amount of positive and negative signs 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
The study set out to explore how two cognitive biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot 
hand effect, exert an effect on crop insurance purchase decision. I used experimental 
methods to accomplish this objective and designed two financially incentive games that 
represented distinct experimental situations. Subjects were assigned to participate in two 
subsequent games. Game One, providing an overall revenue histogram at the beginning 
of the game, allowed subjects to update risk information and make purchase decision 
before a random revenue draw in each period. Game Two showed a new-drawn series 
with 21 revenue observations in each round which could be uncorrelated or correlated 
with a correlation coefficient of 0.7. Each of the two series had 50-50 chance of being 
chosen. Subjects made to purchase insurance after evaluating the risk separately in each 
period. In the analysis, I created streak variables that account for the effect of consecutive 
good and bad revenue years on demand for insurance. The streak variables in both games 
did not show desirable explanatory power to decipher subjects’ purchase behavior; 
thereby the hypotheses concerning hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy were rejected.  
In the analysis of probability perception, it is found that subjects changed the loss 
probability up and down frequently according to statistically significant probability 
change variables in both games. This is consistent with a phenomenon of “mean 
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reversion” which is widely used in finance. But the mean is reverting to an upward biased 
probability level in Game One because the mean of probability of loss is 46% while the 
true loss probability is 33%.  
Another important influencing factor, the probability of loss is statistically 
significant among most samples; the positive sign of loss probability reported by subjects 
strongly demonstrates that subjective probability of risks indeed influences individual’s 
crop insurance purchase decision positively. It is also interesting to find that the 
experience variable in Game One is statistically significant in some samples to 
successfully explain the individual demand for crop insurance. Its positive sign provides 
evidence to argue that in a random situation, the longer the exposure to risky events 
subjects have, the more willing to engage in insurance protection they are.  
Conclusion 
Even though the hypotheses of hot hand effect and gambler’s fallacy failed to be 
supported, the interesting findings mentioned above still enable me to offer some 
constructive suggestions. Concerning the significant effect of subjective probability of 
loss risks on purchase decision and the experimental fact that subjects were bouncing up 
and down to update the loss probability, seemingly seeking the equilibrium, the farm 
bureau or crop insurance companies should establish education programs that are aimed 
to train farmers to understanding the principles of probability theory and fundamentals of 
risk managements. The finding that the longer subjects were exposed to risks the more 
likely they became to buy insurance in the random environment confirms the significance 
and necessity of this education program. From the perspective of farmers, a better 
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understanding of probability would enable them to discover the risks in the real world 
and seek reliable protections.  
For future work, this laboratory experiment can be extended to a field study 
providing an insightful look into cognitive operations within individual farmers. A lab 
experiment with revisions, nevertheless, needs to be tested for a few times before taken 
into field due to some shortcomings in my experiment.  
Given that some subjects who are very well-educated junior/senior undergraduate 
or graduate students showed insufficient understanding of probability theory knowledge 
in experiments, it is reasonable to question that farmers without higher education can be 
able to understand and apply the knowledge into the problem solution. So I would 
suggest that two treatments be created—one with a probability education before 
experiment and one without. It needs to test the effect of education program on demand 
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Crop Insurance Purchase Experiment 
Thank you for attending today, you will be participating in an economic 
experiment where you can earn a payment for participating.  To begin, read and sign the 
disclosure statement; and you will earn a payment as your show-up fee in Holt-Laury 
Choice Task. You will be able to earn more money in this experiment.  I will first explain 
the experiment and then tell you how you will be able to earn more. 
 
Holt-Laury Lottery Choice Task 
 The sheet of paper shows ten rows of questions and each question needs a 
decision which is a paired choice between “Option A” and “Option B”. 
 You will make ten choices and record these in the final column, but only one of 
them will be used in the end to determine your earnings 
 Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine payoffs; the faces are 
numbered from 1 to 10 (the “0” face of the die will serve as 10.)  
 After you have made all your choices, we will throw this die twice, once to select 
one of the ten decisions to be used, and a second time to determine what your 
payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular decision selected.  
o For example, look at Question 1 at the top. In Question 1, for the second 
throw, the higher prize is paid if the throw of die is 1 and the lower prize 
is paid when any other throw appears. For question 2, the higher prize is 
paid when the throw is 1 or 2 while the lower prize is paid for 3 through 
10. 
 The other Questions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the 
chances of the higher payoff for each option increase.  
 Even though you will make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting 
your earnings.  
o You will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each 
decision has an equal chance of being used in the end. 
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To summarize, you will make ten choices: for each Question row you will have to 
choose between Option A and Option B. You may choose A for some Question rows and 
B for other rows and you may change your decisions and make them in any order.  
 When you are finished, we will throw the ten-sided die to select which of the ten 
Questions will be used.  
 Then we will throw the die again to determine your money earnings for the 
Option you chose for that Question. At last, you write your earnings in the blank 
at the top of the page. 
Are there any questions? Now you may begin making your choices. Please do not 



























10% chance of $10.00, 
90% chance of $8.00 
10% chance of $19.00 




20% chance of $10.00, 
80% chance of $8.00 
20% chance of $19.00 




30% chance of $10.00, 
70% chance of $8.00 
30% chance of $19.00, 




40% chance of $10.00, 
60% chance of $8.00 
40% chance of $19.00,             




50% chance of $10.00, 
50% chance of $8.00 
50% chance of $19.00, 




60% chance of $10.00, 
40% chance of $8.00 
60% chance of $19.00, 




70% chance of $10.00, 
30% chance of $8.00 
70% chance of $19.00, 




80% chance of $10.00, 
20% chance of $8.00 
80% chance of $19.00, 




90% chance of $10.00, 
10% chance of $8.00 
90% chance of $19.00, 




100% chance of $10.00, 
0% chance of $8.00 
100% chance of $19.00, 





Game 1  
 In this game you will be playing the role of a farmer growing a crop.  Like most 
crop farmers you do not control either the weather which affects the yield of 
your crop or the market price you will receive at harvest time which occurs 
approximately six months after you plant the crop.   
 You are planning to grow 100 acres of the new crop. On average the revenue 
from this crop is $100/acre/year but it costs $90/acre/year to grow it. So in total 
you will generate $1000 profits on average in each year. There is only one 
harvest per year.  If yields or harvest prices are low you lose money that year.  
 To help you understand the revenue risk of this crop we will show you the 
following histogram of the revenue for the crop, which are 1000 observations 
from the true distribution, on your own computer. You can assume that these 
1000 observations are the past 1000 years’ historical revenues and we are going 
to have a new 50 years to grow crop. The histogram will NOT change throughout 
this game. 
 However you may purchase an insurance product that protects you from low 
revenue. The insurance will work in this manner.  If your revenue falls below 
$90/acre in a year, the insurance will make up the difference with an indemnity 
to you. So 
Indemnity=90-revenue, if revenue is less than 90, else indemnity=0 
o For example, if revenue is $60 per acre the insurance would pay you $30 
per acre or if revenue was $10 per acre the insurance would pay $80 per 
acre.  However, if revenue is over $90 per acre, the insurance pays 
nothing.  The cost of this insurance is [$4 per acre].   
 Then you will be asked to state “what is the probability of collecting insurance 
(the probability that revenue falls below $90 per acre) do you think it would be 
in the next year”. 
o Note you need to input your answer that may fall between 0% meaning 
there is no chance you will receive an indemnity in the next period and 
 
105 
100% meaning you are certain revenue will fall below $90 per acre next 
period. 
 You will be asked “whether or not you are willing to buy an insurance” to 
protect you from potential loss from revenue, or not if you think it is too 
expensive.  
o Noted that this is just a yes-or-no question, and you need to input in the 
respective cell, “1” meaning “willing to buy” and “0” meaning “not willing 
to buy”. 
 Please raise your red card to indicate your completion of this question. After 
everybody raises their cards, an observation of revenue will be randomly drawn 
from the true revenue distribution from which the 1000 historical data 
observations were drawn, and shown on the monitor. You need to input the 
revenue in the cells by yourself and the net return in this round will be shown up 
automatically. To summarize, the average revenue is $100 per acre but the cost 
to grow the crop is $90.  So you would expect to cost $9000 and make 
$1000/year by planting 100 acres of the crop on average. The payoff are coming 
as follow,
Net return crop revenue cost insurance indemnity premium,  if insured,   
Net return crop revenue cost,  if not insured.   
 You will receive one dollar for every $5000 of net return in the game. 
 The last thing to be noted: the cell will be locked after your input and you 
CANNOT go back to edit it. So you’ve just got one chance to input your answer. 





 In this game you will still be playing the role of a farmer growing a crop. Like 
most crop farmers you do not control either the weather which affects the yield 
of your crop or the market price you will receive at harvest time which occurs 
approximately six months after you plant the crop.  
 You are planning to grow 100 acres of the new crop. On average the revenue 
from this crop is $100/acre/year but it costs $90/acre/year to grow it. So in total 
you will generate $1000 profits on average in each year. There is only one 
harvest per year.  If yields or harvest prices are low you lose money that year 
 However you may purchase an insurance product that protects you from low 
revenue. The insurance will work in this manner.  If your revenue falls below 
$90/acre in a year, the insurance will make up the difference with an indemnity 
to you. So 
Indemnity = 90 − revenue, if revenue is less than 90, else indemnity = 0. 
o For example, if revenue is $60 per acre the insurance would pay you $30 
per acre or if revenue was $10 per acre the insurance would pay $80 per 
acre.  However, if revenue is over $90 per acre, the insurance pays 
nothing.  The cost of this insurance is $4 per acre.   
 You will look at 21 observations instead of one in each period. You also need to 
know that there is a 50/50 chance that the 21 revenues from one year to the 
next are either independent or correlated.  That is, if revenues are independent 
across time, then the revenue for this year will have no relationship with next 
year’s revenue.  However, if revenues are correlated then if this year’s revenue 
is above average there is a 70% chance next year’s revenue will be above 
average.  Conversely, if this year’s revenue is below average there would be a 
70% chance next year’s revenue will be below average. 
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o To help you understand what autocorrelation really means. It can be 
defined as “correlation between members of series of observations 
ordered in time and space”16 
o The following are some graphs to help you further understand correlation: 
 










                                                 
16 Maurice G. Kendall and William R. Buckland, A Dictionary of Statistical Terms, Hafner Publishing Company, 
New York, 1971, p. 8. 
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 -90% Autocorrelation 
 
 With the help of the computer, in each round we will draw 21 observations of 
farm revenues, which have a 50/50 chance to be 70% correlated or 
uncorrelated, for you to observe. First twenty observations are shown to you 
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before you make a decision. The last observation will be shown to you to 
determine your net return in this period after you answer the following three 
questions. 
 Based on the twenty observations you were just given,  
 
What is the chance that this crop’s revenue is correlated across time? 
[Note your answer may fall between 0% , meaning there is no 
chance crop revenue is correlated across time and 100% meaning you are 
certain revenue is correlated across time.]  Remember there is 50/50 
chance revenue is correlated across time or not. 
The next question is: 
Given the series you are observing, what is the chance that you will 
collect an indemnity if you purchase the insurance policy? 
[Note your answer may fall between 0% meaning there is no 
chance you will receive an indemnity in the next period and 100% 
meaning you are certain revenue will fall below $90 next period.] 
Then third question is: 
Are you willing to pay [4 $/acre] for the insurance policy to protect your 
revenue?  Answer either yes or no, 1 for “YES” and 0 for “NO”.  
 Please raise your red card to indicate your completion of this question. After 
everybody raises their cards, the computer will show you the last observation 
from the series you observed. You need to input the drawn revenue into the 
cells by yourself. 
o So the actual revenue outcome, according to the explanations above, will 
be correlated with the last observation if drawn from the correlated 
revenue series; or it will be uncorrelated if the observation is from the 
uncorrelated series. This actual revenue will determine the net return 
from the farm and any insurance indemnity to be paid. 
 
 Your second source of earning from this game will be based on the first question 
about whether you think revenues are correlated across time.  Remember, the 
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question asked you what the chances the crop’s revenue is correlated across 
time. The payoff table below shows you that how many points you will obtain 
based on your reported probability if the revenues are “correlated’ or 
“uncorrelated”. (It does not mean you necessarily need to answer in increments 
of 10, you can put any number 0 -100 in percentage) The aggregate earnings 
from every period will be averaged and you will receive one dollar for 1000 
points earned.  







































































o Therefore, as you can discern, the best strategy here for you is to 
honestly tell us the true evaluation of probabilities.  
 Finally, you will earn from the revenue for the farm.  The average revenue per 
acre is $100 but it costs $90 to grow the crop.  So you would expect to make 
$1000/year in 100 acres on average: 
Net return = crop revenue − cost + insurance indemnity − premium, if insured,   
                  Net return = crop revenue − cost,   if not insured.    
o You will receive one dollar for every $5000 of net return in the game. 
o We will conduct 5-10 practice rounds to let you become familiar with the 
game and then play for 50 rounds. 
 The last thing to be noted: the cell will be locked after your input and you 
CANNOT go back to edit it. So you’ve just got one chance to input your answer. 




 After the completion of experiment, please leave your answer sheet and the 








dm log 'clear' output ; 
dm output 'clear' output; 
libname normal'C:\Users\pq17\Desktop\Experiment Data\Mass Data 
Analysis\SAS Analysis\GAME1\normal'; 
 
dm log 'clear' output ; 
dm output 'clear' output; 
libname ROUNDS 'C:\Users\pq17\Desktop\Experiment Data\Mass Data 
Analysis\SAS Analysis\GAME2\rounds'; 
 
/*scoring rule in Game One;/ 
 
data normal.game1; 
 set normal.game1; 




 create table normal.game1_scoring as 
 select sum(dev_rp) as sum_rp from normal.game1 
 group by sub 
 order by sub; 
 
data normal.game1_scoring; 
 set normal.game1_scoring; 
 sqrt_rp=sqrt(sum_rp); 
run; 
proc sort data=normal.game1_scoring; 
 by sub; 
run; 
 
data normal.game1_scoring (keep=sub sqrt_rp rename=(sqrt_rp = score)); 
 set normal.game1_scoring; 
 by sub; 
 if last.sub then output; 
run; 
/*scoring rule in Game Two;/ 
data rounds.qsr; 










































































































 merge rounds.game2 rounds.qsr; 
 by sub; 
run; 
 
data rounds.game2_scoring (keep=sub qsr); 
 set rounds.game2_scoring; 
 score=qsr/1000; 
 drop qsr 
run; 
/*purchase choice in Game One;/ 
data normal.game1_count; 
 set normal.game1; 
 if c=1 then count+1; 
 if first.sub then do; 
 if c=0 then count=0; 




 by sub; 
 if last.sub then output; 
run; 
/*perceived correlation compared to true correlation;/ 
data one; 
 input period corr; 
 datalines; 
























































 create table rounds.corr as 
 select one.period, sub, pa, one.corr 
 from rounds.game2 as a, one 
 where a.period=one.period 
 order by period; 
 
data rounds.corr1; 
 set rounds.corr; 
 if pa=50 then subcorr=1;else if pa<50 then subcorr=0; else 
subcorr=99; 
 if subcorr=99 then t=99; 
 if corr=1 and subcorr^=99 then do; 
  if subcorr=1 then t=1; 
  if subcorr=0 then t=3; 
 end; 
 if corr=0 and subcorr^=99 then do; 
  if subcorr=0 then t=4; 
  if subcorr=1 then t=2; 
 end; 
 if t^=99 then output; 
run; 
 
proc freq data=rounds.corr1; 
 table t; 
run; 
 
/*purchase choice in Game One;/ 
data normal.game1_count; 
 set normal.game1; 
 if c=1 then count+1; 
 if first.sub then do; 
 if c=0 then count=0; 
 if c=1 then count=1; 
 end; 
 by sub; 
 if last.sub then output; 
run; 
 
/*purchase choice in Game Two;/ 
data rounds.game2_count; 
 set rounds.game2; 
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 if c=1 then count+1; 
 if first.sub then do; 
 if c=0 then count=0; 
 if c=1 then count=1; 
 end; 
 by sub; 
 if last.sub then output; 
run; 
/*test for the normality of purchase choices in two games;/ 
proc univariate data=normal.game1_count normal; 
 var count_of_purchase; 
run; 
proc univariate data=rounds.game2_count normal; 
 var count_of_purchase; 
run; 
 
/*test for the difference of purchase choices within individual in two 
games;/ 
proc sql; 
 create table normal.compare1 as 
 select a.sub, (a.count_of_purchase-b.count_of_purchase) as diff 
 from normal.game1_count as a, (select * from rounds.game2_count  
         group by sub 
having count(*) not in (42, 43, 88)) as b 
   where a.sub=b.sub; 
 
proc univariate data=normal.compare1; 
 var diff; 
run; 
/*probability regression in Game One;/ 
data normal.game1_pc; 





 do i=0 to 91; 






















proc means data=normal.game1_pc maxdec=2; 
 var pch pch1 pch2 pch3; 
run; 
 
proc reg data=normal.game1_pc; 
 model pch = pch1 pch2 pch3; 
 by sub; 




%macro sign(set=, testvar = ); 
 %let k=1; 
 %let var = %scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %do %while (&var NE); 
  data normal.&set; 
   set normal.&set; 
   if variable ="&var" then do; 
    if 0<probt<0.1 then 
    do; 
     if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1; 
     else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1; 
    end; 
   end; 
  run; 
   
  proc freq data=normal.&set; 
   tables sig_&var 
  run; 
  %let k=%eval(&k+1); 
  %let var=%scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %end; 
%mend; 
%sign(set=pc_est, testvar=pch1 pch2 pch3); 
 
 













 set rounds.game2_pc; 
 do i=0 to 91; 




















proc means data= rounds.game2_pc maxdec=2; 
 var pch pch1 pch2 pch3; 
run; 
 
proc reg data= rounds.game2_pc; 
 model pch = pch1 pch2 pch3; 
 by sub; 




%macro sign(set=, testvar = ); 
 %let k=1; 
 %let var = %scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %do %while (&var NE); 
  data rounds.&set; 
   set rounds.&set; 
   if variable ="&var" then do; 
    if 0<probt<0.1 then 
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    do; 
     if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1; 
     else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1; 
    end; 
   end; 
  run; 
   
  proc freq data=rounds.&set; 
   tables sig_&var 
  run; 
  %let k=%eval(&k+1); 
  %let var=%scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %end; 
%mend; 
%sign(set=pc_est, testvar=pch1 pch2 pch3); 
/*demand regression without square terms in Game One;/ 
 
data normal.game1_pc; 
 set normal.game1_pc; 
 do i=0 to 91; 









 set normal.game1_pc; 
 if 0<=gy<3 then gy=0; 





 set normal.game1_pc; 
 period1=lag(period); 
 do i=0 to 91; 




proc means data=normal.game1_pc maxdec=2; 





proc logistic data=normal.game1_pc ; 
 model c (event='1') = pi gy by period1 / firth maxiter=99999; 
 by sub; 




%macro sign_chi(set=, testvar = ); 
 %let k=1; 
 %let var = %scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %do %while (&var NE); 
  data normal.&set; 
   set normal.&set; 
   if variable ="&var" then do; 
    if 0<probchisq<0.1 then 
    do; 
     if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1; 
     else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1; 
    end; 
   end; 
  run; 
  
  proc freq data=rounds.&set; 
   tables sig_&var 
  run; 
 
  %let k=%eval(&k+1); 




%sign_chi(set=choice_est, testvar=pi gy by period1) 
 
 
/*demand regression without square terms in Game Two;/ 
proc logistic data=normal.game1_pc ; 
 model c (event='1') = pi gy by gysq bysq period1 / firth 
maxiter=99999; 
 by sub; 
 ods output ParameterEstimates=normal.choice_Est 
FitStatistics=normal.choice_fit; 
run; 
%sign_chi(set=choice_est, testvar=pi gy by gysq bysq period1) 
 
 




 input period goodyear badyear; 
 datalines; 
1  0  1 
2  0  1 
3  2  0 
4  0  1 
5  2  0 
6  6  0 
7  0  1 
8  5  0 
9  4  0 
10  10  0 
11  0  2 
12  2  0 
13  8  0 
14  16  0 
15  0  1 
16  0  2 
17  7  0 
18  8  0 
19  1  0 
20  0  1 
21  12  0 
22  4  0 
23  0  5 
24  1  0 
25  1  0 
26  1  0 
27  11  0 
28  0  6 
29  1  0 
30  7  0 
31  2  0 
32  1  0 
33  11  0 
34  0  1 
35  1  0 
36  0  1 
37  1  0 
38  5  0 
39  1  0 
40  3  0 
41  0  2 
42  3  0 
43  5  0 
44  0  1 
45  4  0 
46  1  0 
47  1  0 
48  9  0 
49  0  2 








proc sort data=rounds.game2; 




 set rounds.game2; 
 period+1; 
 if first.sub then period=1; 
 by sub; 
run; 
proc sql; 
 create table rounds.g2 as 
 select * 
 from rounds.game2 as a,  
   two as b 
 where a.period=b.period 




 set rounds.g2; 
 period1=lag(period); 
 do i=0 to 94; 
 if _n_=1+50*i then period1=0; 
 end; 
 drop i; 
run; 
 
proc means data=rounds.g2 maxdec=2; 
 var c pi pa goodyear badyear period1; 
run; 
 
proc logistic data=rounds.g2; 
 model c (event='1') = pi pa goodyear badyear period1/ firth 
maxiter=99999; 
 by sub; 
 ods output ParameterEstimates=rounds.est; 
run; 
 
%macro sign_chisq(set=, testvar = ); 
 %let k=1; 
 %let var = %scan(&testvar, &k); 
 %do %while (&var NE); 
  data rounds.&set; 
   set rounds.&set; 
   if variable ="&var" then do; 
    if 0<probchisq<0.1 then 
    do; 
     if estimate>0 then sig_&var=1; 
     else if estimate<0 then sig_&var=-1; 
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    end; 
   end; 
  run; 
 
proc freq data=rounds.&set; 
   tables &var; 
  run; 
 
  %let k=%eval(&k+1); 




%sign_chisq(set=est, testvar=pi pa goodyear badyear period1) 
